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ABSTRACT
The Hope for Peace & the Case for War in the Postwar Soviet Union
by
Shawn Cecconi

The postwar Soviet Union remained militarized and failed to reform itself because of its
ideological concerns against the West and its new satellite states, all at the cost of the Soviet
people. This analysis will compare the Soviet government’s external focus and the Soviet
people’s domestic problems in the aftermath of the Second World War. The country’s
ideological, military, and imperial concerns abroad emphasized militarization over domestic
revitalization. The Soviet people widely expected significant action from their government to
remedy economic and political issues. The Soviet government nevertheless committed itself in
focusing on outside concerns regardless of the harsh reality of everyday postwar society.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The Origins of the Soviet Paradigm
The postwar Soviet Union remained militarized and failed to reform itself because of its
ideological concerns against the West and its new satellite states, all at the cost of the Soviet
people. This analysis will compare the Soviet government’s external focus and the Soviet
people’s domestic problems in the aftermath of the Second World War. The country’s
ideological, military, and imperial concerns abroad emphasized militarization over domestic
revitalization. The Soviet people widely expected significant action from their government to
remedy economic and political problems. The Soviet government nevertheless committed itself
in focusing on outside concerns regardless of the harsh reality of everyday postwar society.
This paper attempts to prove the significance of international issues within Soviet priorities.
It does not argue that these priorities existed by themselves within Soviet thinking. The country
was an insular society that mostly remained closed to the West. Joseph Stalin’s conception of
“socialism in one country” made it clear that domestic priorities mattered.1 The combination of
Marxist-Leninist ideals and a changed postwar world meant that domestic priorities were more
neglected. This was not so simple as a black and white change. There is a complex synthesis
between international and domestic priorities within Soviet thinking. A new heavy industrial
factory could supply manufacturing capability and bolster the number working class people
within the country. It could also contribute to the nation’s military-industrial complex, indirectly
protecting against capitalist threats outside the country. If the machine tools for the factory came
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from war reparations from East Germany or the factory builds equipment to support the
industrialization of a satellite state, then the factory assumes an imperialist dimension too. Both
international and domestic priorities are involved in its consideration. The result is a combination
of ideological, military, and imperial priorities that Soviet authorities followed in the postwar
era. This trifecta of decision making led the country’s leadership to embark on often
contradictory and shameless foreign policy to achieve their goals.
This paper also connects peace with the West and domestic reforms for the Soviet people as
they were really two sides of the same coin or kopek. An ideological viewpoint proves peace and
domestic improvements were both synonymous and impossible in the postwar years. True peace
with the West could only ideologically occur when all societies were classless. More bluntly, the
West would have to cease to exist for a world of classless societies to occur. This paper will
show that Soviet leadership was convinced the start of this process would begin within several
decades at most.2 Only then, could the Soviet Union say that it was on the cusp of achieving
communism and the people could rest easy. Society would no longer have to remain militarized
in the face of the capitalist threat. Light industry and consumer goods could come before military
production. The country could import food without fear of compromising collectivization. For
the nation and its people, everything rode upon this future. This utopian vision would never have
come close to taking place under the postwar Stalinist consensus. In comparison, the Khrushchev
years involved at least some domestic reforms, increased consumer goods, and attempts at
compromise with the West. Although none of these necessarily reached their full potential. This
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lost potential stemmed from the Stalinist world view that Khrushchev did not actually renounce.
This paper explores the original rejected diplomatic options and suppressed societal demands
that preceded the Khrushchev years.
In the context of the continued survival of the West, the Khrushchev years were an anathema
to Soviet postwar policies. The change required a rejection of the party line that never would
have been possible before his de-Stalinization speech in 1956. Soviet priorities after Khrushchev
decidedly shifted from the final years of Stalin and realized at least some postwar possibilities.
But in the context of the immediate postwar years, that is irrelevant. The real question is why did
this change not occur earlier either in foreign or domestic policy? There are the previously
mentioned ideological hurdles, although Khrushchev did surmount many of those after Stalin’s
death. If Stalin was to blame, then there theoretically should have been a chance in 1953 when he
died. There was also the turbulent postwar international system, which had yet to fully solidify
and allow for any stable détente.3 Yet the postwar Soviet diplomacy still followed the spirit of
wartime cooperation with the West which could have alleviated tensions. Perhaps all the
variables for peace existed and simply did not coincide. If that is really the case, then it only
represents another great tragedy in this comedy of errors.
Internally, the Soviet Union was a society that endured the First World War, the Russian
Civil War, war communism, collectivization, the Five-Year Plans, and the Second World War.
On top of this, Stalin alluded to at least three more Five-Year Plans, sustained militarization, and
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the economic burden of a Soviet empire to face future Western aggression according to Stalin.4
This seemingly endless wartime mentality stems from Soviet leadership adopting a paranoid,
Marxist approach in their perspective towards the West. The need to carry on pursuing this
ideological course was in some ways a natural product of continued tragedy. The Soviet
experience was continuous perseverance of crises, so why would the postwar years be any
different? Stalin fully equated the postwar era with the interwar years and expected everything to
end in another war just like in 1939.5 There were differences in Soviet society compared to the
past, however. Red Army soldiers fought through highly developed Central Europe and favored
various changes back home. Soviet citizens experienced both a window of domestic
development in the 1930s and a wave of optimistic propaganda of their future. At least some
Soviet leaders were optimistic that the society that won against fascism was now capable of a
change of course. Yet this was a pandora’s box of change that would only begin to rear its head
in 1956. In the meantime, the nation committed itself over juggling its immediate postwar
concerns through its traditional perspective. Soviet society would become burdened under
continued wartime measures and a paranoid vision of the future for some time to come.
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CHAPTER 2. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
Ideology, Imperialism, & The Capitalist Threat
The Soviet Union’s ideological, military, and imperial concerns abroad emphasized
militarization over domestic revitalization. The country entered a chaotic postwar international
environment after the Second World War while suffering with a war-torn homeland that left
them vulnerable. But the country also emerged from the war with a renewed sense of ideological
legitimacy and pride. The Soviets viewed the postwar West as the same as interwar Europe, a
doomed system that would either tear itself apart or direct its violence towards the Soviet Union
again. The Kremlin leadership thus decided that external problems were the most pressing matter
the country had at the time. Any actions taken by the West were inherently dangerous when
viewed through this pessimistic ideological prism. This resulted in standoffish or aggressive
diplomacy, militarism, and imperialism in any Soviet policies and agendas. The chance for peace
in Europe would drift further away as these actions alienated the West. In most cases, alternative
options existed that offered relief to these tensions. Such actions could preserve Soviet security
and stability at a lower cost than intensifying the Cold War. At the same time, the Soviet home
front benefited and suffered from Soviet external policies. The borders of the Soviet bloc
expanded, providing safety and the resources of imperial holdings. These advantages came at a
heavy cost of tensions with the West, material aid for satellite states, and continuous militarism,
all at the cost of Soviet society.
1945 represented a watershed moment for both the legitimacy of communism and its
capability on the world stage. Decades earlier, the ideology existed in its infancy behind a
nebulous curtain of Soviet secrecy. The war legitimized the ideology through its victory over
Nazism in the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet name for the Second World War. Joseph Stalin

10

gave a speech at the Bolshoi Theater in 1946 that described their new postwar reality. He said
that the “war was the fiercest and most arduous ever fought in the history of our Motherland”
that acted as “an examination of our Soviet system.” The results of this examination revealed that
“first of all, our Soviet social system was victorious,” he said, because it’s “a genuinely people's
system, which grew up from the ranks of the people.” The statement ties the war’s victory to the
legitimacy of communist ideals. “Secondly,” he said, “our victory signifies that our Soviet state
system was victorious, that our multinational Soviet state passed all the tests of the war and
proved its viability.” The Soviet Union was a multinational state composed of different ethnic
and cultural divisions. Stalin argues that critics outside the Soviet Union predicted “that the
Soviet Union would share the fate of Austria-Hungary.”6 The success of the multiethnic empire
under one banner was another vindication of the Soviet social system in holding them together
under the threat of war (ignoring failed attempts to break free during the war).7 It was also a
harbinger of the imperialist tendencies of Soviet thinking. If the country could hold together
ethnic groups from Estonia to Siberia, why couldn’t the country hold their occupied European
states under a similar system?
The third point in Stalin’s speech was the most nuanced and led into his postwar national
priorities. He commended the success of the Red Army in enduring the war and defeating the
enemy.8 But he then explains that none of these victories would have been possible if not for the
industrial ability derived from the Five-Year Plans.9 He harps on how “it would be impossible to
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defend our country without heavy industry” the plans developed. The country would now need
“perhaps, another three Five-Year Plans, if not more,” to defend against a potential future foreign
threat. “But it can be done, and we must do it.”10 These original plans certainly helped prepare
the country to fight in the war. Yet the industrial drives also extracted a heavy human toll.
Vyacheslav Molotov, one of Stalin’s closest magnates, recalled that while the Five-Year Plans
were necessary, “The people went through a colossal strain before the war…And still there were
things that cannot be justified” beyond that.11 Despite this cost, the Soviets had no alternative
outside of a Marxist-Leninist preparation for the next war. Further actions justified in this
manner would take place both at home and abroad which would further justify Molotov’s
critique that “there were things that cannot be justified.”12
The lofty perspectives of the postwar Soviet Union even served to alienate growing
efforts to introduce socialism in Eastern Europe. Yugoslavian communist Milovan Djilas
recalled the aftermath of trying to resolve an issue on unruly Red Army troops. After explaining
the situation “in an extremely mild and polite form,” the Soviet delegate quickly protested
“against such insinuations” which were comparable to “armies of capitalist countries.” 13 Djilas
soon received the label of a “Trotskyist” behind closed doors and Soviet passive aggressiveness
then expanded through the media and diplomatic channels.14 In a “coup de grâce,” Stalin mocked
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the entire delegation. He asked why the Yugoslavs had to be hostile to a Soviet “soldier who has
crossed thousands of kilometers through blood and fire and death” to have “fun with a woman”
on Yugoslavian clay.15 Djilas’s lesson from the affair was that the Soviets embodied “arrogance
and a rebuff typical of a big state toward a small one, of the strong toward the weak”16 These
“hegemonistic” tendencies ultimately placed Soviet nationalism and military-ideological pride
above any semblance of socialist fraternity. This reality convinced Stalin “that his society
contained no contradictions and that it exhibited superiority to other societies in every way,”
Djilas concluded.17
Regardless of whether a country was capitalist or socialist, in Soviet eyes, they existed
within a unilateral framework that left little room for compromise on even minor issues. This
would become of extreme importance when interacting with the West and deciding Soviet
policies after the fact. The hubris surrounding Soviet ideals easily extended into foreign and
domestic policies. Soviet leadership understood that their victory in the war was an opportunity
for expanding their ideology across Europe and the world. Molotov recalled that “our system
passed the test of war, as did our party and our people.” The key was the ideological and
nationalist “great historical destiny and fateful mission of the Russian people—…to be the
universal, all-embracing humanitarian union of nations.”18 At a party after the war, Molotov put
this reality more candidly. In a toast to Stalin, he declared “If you weren’t Stalin, the USSR
would not have…conquered such an empire for socialism.” According to historian Simon
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Montefiore, this toast “pleased” Stalin, who was usually reluctant to receive such unabashed
praise.19
The Kremlin’s growing imperial pride compares with traditional Russian imperialism. In
fact, such a model could help in understanding Soviet imperialism. But as Molotov argued, this
was not simply classic “Great Russian chauvinism but historical truth.” At its heart, the Kremlin
believed Marxist-Leninism was on the cusp of another moment in world history that they
intended to take full advantage of as Lenin once did.20 Of course, reality was often different than
Kremlin thinking. These assurances of the future coincided with a shift in Soviet attitudes
towards the West over the postwar system. At the Potsdam Conference, Winston Churchill
complained that the Soviets were exerting too much control in Central Europe. Molotov recalls
that the prime minister argued, “but Lvov was never a Russian city!” Stalin replied, “but Warsaw
was.”21 Stalin’s not so subtle recognition of the implicit restoration of imperial borders and more
shows his willingness to follow old imperial notions when it helped them over the capitalists.
These borders would also guarantee the spread of socialism and protect the Soviet Union from
military threats.
The Second World War’s conclusion altered how the Soviet Union perceived its wartime
allies overall. Stalin and many of his associates became convinced again of the threat the
Western Allies posed to Soviet interests. These concerns increasingly directed the country to
carry on building a military-industrial complex at the cost of its domestic sphere. This postwar
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militarism would have continued growing unabated if not for Stalin’s death.22 But the civilian
economy still faced a tremendous military-industrial complex that was difficult to reduce given
an ideological and political need for it.23 Stalin’s 1946 speech reveals many core expectations the
Soviet Union held about the West’s perceived militarism and instability. He begins with an
outline of the Marxist interpretation of the causes of the Second World War. He says, “the war
broke out as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on
the basis of present-day monopolistic capitalism.” This state of capitalism vs. fascism was
certainly new, but the processes that led to the war were quite familiar to the Soviet Union. Stalin
reflected that “the development of world capitalism in our times does not proceed smoothly and
evenly, but through crises and catastrophic wars.” He provides the example of the First World
War as a similar conflict. He further explains that the global economic and political systems
created by capitalist nations inevitably lead to instability and armed conflict.24
State sanctioned popular media reflected the Kremlin’s own sentiments towards the West.
Author and journalist Pyotr Pavlenko’s novel Happiness, a winner of the prestigious Stalin Prize,
includes numerous reflections on the West and its relation to the Soviet Union. The main
character, Col. Voropayev, acts as head interpreter for several British and American delegates in
Crimea near the end of the war. Voropayev observes that Delano Roosevelt was a “great man”
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that inspired “good impressions upon those around him.”25 These sentiments mirror that of even
Stalin himself, who stated later in his life that “Roosevelt was a great statesman…and liberal
leader who prolonged the life of capitalism.”26 Voropayev then observed that Churchill on the
other hand, was a “tired businessman” who was “obese and senile-looking.” At best, he could
say that Churchill was more “astonishing rather than likeable.” 27 Pavlenko’s description of
Churchill as a rather stereotypical “businessman” would have tied the prime minister to
capitalism within the eyes of Soviet readers. Voropayev’s discussions with an American
journalist named Harris reveal even more. He argues that “your bankers have but one aim: to
convert America into a stronghold of militarism, and Churchill will thank heaven that he had
managed in time to make such good militarists of them. Churchill is their god, not Roosevelt.
Roosevelt is too good for them.”28 Voropayev notably connects the banking sector and Western
militarism. For a Soviet reader in 1947, the passage implicitly justified aggressive Soviet
militarism, diplomacy, and imperialism abroad. The West appeared deceptive as it switched from
the image of Roosevelt’s perceived cooperation to Cold War mistrust. Soviet actions appeared to
simply stand in opposition of perceived capitalist aggression.
This overall rejection of anything in the West considered capitalist would play an
important and nuanced role in Soviet analysis of the early Cold War. A year before Happiness
released, George Kennan, an American diplomat in Moscow, sent a secret telegram back to the
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United States underlining how the Soviet Union was a threat to American affairs and how to
tackle the problem.29 The worsening affairs and Kenan’s “long telegram” (1946) all contributed
to already icy Soviet-American relations. Despite the telegram’s secrecy, Stalin himself was
aware of its contents and organized a response. Nikolai Novikov, Soviet ambassador to the
United States (1946-1947), created the response to the telegram which reflected the official
Soviet stance on rapidly chilling Soviet-American relations. The document was important
enough to call for the significant involvement of Molotov, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs
at the time. The archival document of the telegram even shows Molotov’s underlining
throughout. Novikov argued that the United States was quickly being “consumed by a desire for
world domination.” He also summarized a variety of increasing American military and economic
activities around the world.30
Many of these concerns were based in the understatement of the century that “US foreign
policy is…quite different from that which existed in the prewar period.” 31 A closer examination
of many of Novikov’s points reveals an ideological blindness that hurt the Soviet analysis of the
situation. He argues that in Eastern Europe, “democratic regimes have also been created
and…maintain relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of friendship and mutual aid
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agreements.”32 In contrast to these supposed democratization efforts, American activities in
Western Europe were perceived as “a serious danger to peace.”33 Molotov characterized the
governments of capitalist countries as dictatorships “of the bourgeoisie” as opposed to the
proletariat.34 The actual political character of these governments meant little compared to their
economic and ultimately ideological credentials. This assessment easily translated into
interpretations of Western actions in a hostile manner. Novikov specifically focuses on the “antiSoviet” occupation of western Germany. He contends that American de-Nazification policies
failed to remove either capitalists or large land holders and constituted a failure to implement
“democratic principles” within the Soviet conception. His arguments in opposition of
industrialization over an “agrarian policy” may allude to the failed Morgenthau Plan. Such a plan
would have been devastating for the postwar German economy and people. Regardless, his
support of such a policy may allude to its ability to satisfy Soviet paranoia of a renewed postwar
Germany. This callousness over human lives in Germany was a complex issue. Both Novikov
and Stalin’s Bolshoi Theater speech invoke the legacy of two world wars and Germany’s role in
invading Russia.35 The perceived culpability of Germany was a significant influence in keeping
them down. Western efforts to revitalize the country outside of socialist principles were a threat,
regardless of whether that was really the case. Soviet designs for Germany were initially fluid
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beyond these ideological considerations though. This stemmed from Stalin’s own “flexible and
probing approach” to international relations which he followed through the postwar era.36
This flexible approach could involve drastic actions like aggressive diplomacy. Historian
John Gaddis points out that in quick succession, Stalin challenged the postwar status quo with
the Western Allies over Iran, the territorial sovereignty of Turkey, and in the administration of
Italian colonies in North Africa.37 If he succeeded, he would have easily gained the Soviet Union
more ideological and military parity with the West. He would have also furthered the reach of
the rapidly expanding Soviet empire and provided it access to the Mediterranean Sea and Iranian
oil supplies. Yet Stalin overreached with his diplomacy and spooked his allies. The AngloAmericans would increasingly take a hardline stance against Soviet diplomatic excesses
abroad.38 On the other hand, there was a more pragmatic side of Stalin’s calculations, too. Djilas
observes that during the Greek Civil War, instead of aiding the communist side as anticipated,
Stalin declared that “Greece is a different case [from China]—we should not hesitate but let us
put an end to the Greek uprising.” He explained that unlike the Chinese Civil War, “the United
States is directly engaged there—the strongest state in the world.” Djilas himself was more
cynical of Stalin’s motives, speculating that if a real war started, it could, “if not drag him into
war, then endanger his already-won positions.”39 Thus, there were two lines Stalin avoided
crossing in the postwar years. The first was his conception of Marxist-Leninist principles. The
second was that Stalin was cautious enough to not push diplomatic opportunities far enough to
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risk war. The Soviet Union may have used jingoist, Marxist rhetoric, but it did not want another
world war. This was not entirely clear to the West, however.
Stalin’s diplomatic flexibility reached some major limits on the future of Germany. The
country had become a threat to Soviet interests twice in Stalin’s lifetime. Djilas heard him saying
that “No, they will recover, and very quickly…Give them twelve to fifteen years and they’ll be
on their feet again.”40 This Marxist-historical argument became official Soviet policy. In 1952,
Stalin argued in the Soviet newspaper Pravda that “Germany revived and rose to her feet as a
great power within some 15 to 20 years after her defeat” in the First World War. American aid to
Germany was accelerating a second revival of “her economic war potential,” Stalin observed. So
far, Soviet predictions were that the militarist tendencies of capitalists would be between
themselves and not the Soviet Union. But he concluded, “In order to eliminate the inevitability of
wars [Western] imperialism must be destroyed.”41 This last statement became a feedback loop.
The Soviet Union could only ensure domestic tranquility by avoiding it to work on militarism,
socialism, and imperialism abroad. This angered Western powers, which in turn threatened
Soviet security. Stalin seemed flexible in Soviet diplomacy. This trifecta of priorities meant that
Soviet foreign policy was on a foregone path. Historian Vladislav Zubok used the phrase
“revolutionary-imperial paradigm” to characterize this all-consuming issue that the Soviet Union
existed under.42 Djilas explains that the earliest comprehensive German policy he heard in 1946
argued for an entirely communist Germany. He points out that this idea seemed absurd and
wrapped up in the Soviet heady “flush of military victories and by their hopes for the economic
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and other dissolution of Western Europe.” In late 1947, he heard a new concept from Stalin
himself. Djilas recorded Stalin saying, “The West will make Western Germany their own, and
we shall turn Eastern Germany into our own state.”43 When implemented, this policy would sour
relations with the West and bring East Germany completely into the Soviet camp. Such an action
would have been difficult to reverse and showed Stalin’s newfound belief that further successful
unilateral diplomacy was fading.
Yet on the surface, there appeared to be further opportunities for a united Germany and a
reduction of Cold War tensions. On March 10, 1952, Stalin provided the West with the first of a
series of notes proposing a neutral Germany once again. The first note provides a list of
innocuous and agreeable terms for the reunification and normalization of Germany. It included
proposals guaranteeing the rights of Germans, plans of holding elections, and the idea of future
German neutrality.44 The fundamental flaw with the document began with the West’s increasing
understanding of Soviet ideological thinking. The American response to the letter responded
warmly to the overall ideas proposed. Yet the Americans also picked apart the duplicity of the
letter. The letter’s open interpretation allowed for the real possibility of significant Soviet and
German Democratic Republic (GDR) influence in whatever future nation emerged out of the
deal.45 The creation of a truly neutral Germany could also contradict the evolving socialist
movement and damage the credibility of the ideology if it did not respect the Kremlin’s wishes in
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any major ways. A later agreement between the Soviets and Germans backed the first
cooperative assumption. The document concluded that the GDR was the “bulwark of the struggle
of German people for a united, peace-loving democratic Germany.”46 The specific phrasing of
“peace-loving” follows Soviet “struggle for peace” propaganda which the West would have
considered a dog whistle covering Marxist-Leninist ideals.47 This concept was the public face of
the conception that the capitalist world was aggressive while the socialist one was not. The
agreement therefore makes clear that a unified “peace-loving” Germany would have to be in the
socialist camp.
Soviet and GDR leadership remained on the course of introducing socialism to East
Germany despite widespread East German backlash as well. In 1953, a worker’s uprising
occurred that demanded a relaxation of the breakneck socialist policies which hurt the living
standards of everyday Germans. The revolt demonstrated many problems with the socialist
course within East Germany and Soviet imperial extraction. A report issued to the Kremlin
afterwards first claimed that fascists and American intelligence services riled up the workingclass demonstrators. After further blaming American capitalist influence for much of the affair, it
then pragmatically recommends economic and political reforms to solve the problem. Most
notably, the report blames the East German plan of “the construction of socialism, regardless of
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any difficulties,” a faulty one that alienated the people.48 It even calls for the removal from
power of Walter Ulbricht, a notable leader of the GDR. More importantly for the Soviets, it
recommended more food imports, a halt in reparations payments, fees for Red Army occupation
reduced, and the legitimizing of East German marks in relation to Soviet currency.49 If followed
through, the document would stand as a major shift in Soviet policies towards the GDR.
Behind the paper’s knee jerk accusations of the West, there was a spectrum of Soviet
ideological, imperial, and military influences that created such dissatisfaction. The prevention of
resurgent German militarism and the creation of a fellow socialist state did play a significant role
in the revolt. But for several years after the war’s conclusion, the Soviet Union benefited from
various forms of appropriation in their occupation zone. Stalin made it an immediate priority in
1945 to begin stripping all industrial equipment in areas of Berlin that belonged to the Western
occupation zones prior to the West’s arrival in these areas.50 This equipment would be valuable
in restoring and increasing the industrial capabilities of the Soviet Union. Later that year, the
policy evolved to avoid depleting the Soviet occupation zone. You cannot have a working-class
without factories after all. Instead, stock companies were set up to control a large minority of
East Germany’s industries. Zubok observes that “Soviet interests in Germany were so diverse
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and contradictory that…officials continually had to walk the tightrope.” 51 This imperial
extraction of German resources partially stemmed from legitimate and illegitimate reparations
for the war. The industries of the original Five-Year plans were mostly on the west side of the
Soviet Union devastated by war. Stalin even tactfully acknowledged this failure in his Bolshoi
Theater speech.52 But the policy likely echoed Tsarist imperialism through its callousness to its
occupation of similar lands. This resource extraction was occurring across non-Soviet parts of
the future Soviet bloc as well. Djilas saw that the wealth of these countries “was being extracted
in various ways” and only occasionally paid off using old worthless German currency. He saw
the “impotence and subservience among the Rumanian authorities” that made his compatriots
likely thank their red stars that they had liberated Yugoslavia and not the Soviets.53
Central and Eastern European countries under Soviet occupation further complicated any
hope of military de-escalation because of what these countries provided to the Soviet Union.
These future socialist neighbors offered the Soviet Union a defense against future invasions,
socialist brotherhood, and imperial resources. The only major policy shift involved slowing these
measures to avoid too much dissatisfaction within these counties. Molotov recalled that the final
consensus in the Kremlin was that “a more cautious approach must be employed” to achieve
socialism until “it became possible to take this or that step with confidence, then accelerate the
process.”54 Whether this was a case of compassion or turning up the heat slowly enough for the
occupied peoples not to realize is left unsaid. In August of 1953, Soviet and East German
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delegates met in Moscow to hash out a deal based on post-uprising conclusions and the evolving
nature of Germany within Soviet calculations. On the face of it, the conference recognized the
continual division of Germany presented a major problem for the entirety of the German people.
A peace treaty and a unified Germany would remain to be a publicized goal of the two nations.
The deal also initiated “a series of political and economic measures aimed at rendering assistance
in the further development of the national economy of the GDR.” These changes furthered joint
German-Soviet efforts “in the struggle for peace in Europe.” This agreement formalized several
of the more moderate changes brought up in the report created after the worker’s uprising. This
includes a relaxation or termination of several sets of reparation payments, loans, and occupation
fees the East German government had been paying. It also included 590 million rubles of food
and raw materials from the Soviet Union for the GDR and a large line of credit. Perhaps most
importantly for many Germans, it included a pledge to finally release most wartime POWs who
were still in labor camps in the Soviet Union.55 The agreement in the context of the SovietGerman relationship appeared to be a radical departure from taking to giving.
Yet as far as Soviet ideological, military, and imperial concerns went, everything
remained effectively the same. The Soviet occupation represented and would go on to represent a
vast exchange of resources between the two countries. Only now it was more consensual on the
surface. Soviet industry propped up by German machine tools would now rebuild East
Germany.56 In light of the famines occurring within the Soviet Union, the commitment of
foodstuffs would seem wrong, but it was not that different from the difficulties in keeping the
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occupying Red Army fed either.57 Most importantly, the conference signified the furthest move
yet towards Soviet backed socialism. East Germany was even further committed in the
paradoxical “struggle for peace” that pitted a supposedly peaceful communist bloc against a
hostile capitalist West.58 The conference notably ended just a day shy of the anniversary of the
last Stalin note provided to the West. Soviet diplomacy appeared to have finished a drastic shift
from conditional wartime diplomacy back to some semblance of pre-war spheres of influence.
But given Stalin’s statement in 1947 to Djilas about Germany, the diplomatic policies changed
less than they appeared to. The Soviet Union had successfully achieved most of its defensive and
imperial goals in Germany. Now, it just needed to implement socialism. Soviet officials certainly
had no realistic or comprehensive designs for the future of Germany in 1945. These same
officials did keep to the broad ideal of unilaterally advancing Soviet interests and keeping
Germany militarily suppressed. However, the Soviet Union now needed to defend against an
evolving Western threat that had little trust in Soviet diplomacy.
Soviet leadership was quite ill-prepared to understand the relationship between America
and Britain despite their wartime cooperation. Novikov’s telegram argues that in preparation for
world domination, American activities were dividing the world “into American and British
spheres of influence.” He did recognize that there was growing Anglo-American military and
economic cooperation. In the short run, this cooperation would successfully reduce conflict
between Western powers and enhance American economic dominance. Yet eventually, any
Anglo-American cooperation would fail. American economic influence in both Britain and its
colonies was “quite conflictive” and “a danger to Britain.” For example, he argues that the
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British sterling bloc would fall under American influence and subvert Britain’s economic
independence. In the end, Novikov argues that one of the dependences or colonies of Britain
would form the “focal point” of a new conflict. 59 In many ways, he was right. American
economic influence eventually replaced the sterling bloc, American efforts at encouraging
British decolonization worked, and American capital increasingly poured into Britain. Yet his
conclusion that these changes would create conflict failed in the context of the Cold War. Part of
this failure may stem from the Anglo-American special relationship or the increasing influence
of decolonization in general. British priorities were the opposite of Moscow’s beliefs as they
favored remaining in the American camp, even at the cost of a weakened empire. 60 Regardless of
the causes, Novikov’s ideological interpretation of the West, Soviet diplomacy, and Soviet
military posturing contributed to this intelligence failure. This would begin to cause too many
differences in the alliance which would further reinforce Soviet insecurity.
Happiness has sections analyzing Anglo-American relations in a manner near identical to
Novikov’s sentiments. Voropayev observes of the Westerners in Crimea, that there was a
“precariousness of the friendship between the sailors of the two kindred Allied powers” in which
“each side sought and found occasion to quarrel.”61 Upon receiving his duties as an interpreter,
Voropayev finds out from another officer that “if the Americans and English start a scrap with
each other, it will be your duly to pacify them.”62 This inherent state of conflict between
American and British sailors can be compared to the Soviet interpretation of Anglo-American
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relations in Novikov’s telegram. Later, he openly discusses the future of England with the
American journalist Harris. Voropayev describes Britain as America’s “kept woman…promising
to leave him a big legacy if he loves her while she lives.” Harris mockingly responds later that
“We are not rich enough to keep England.” “But neither is England rich enough to yield herself
to you for nothing,” Voropayev responds.63 His bitter retort reflects the belief of the inevitability
of Anglo-American conflict stemming from the nature of capitalist values. The special
relationship between the two certainly had problems the Soviets witnessed at the Tehran
Conference (1943). For example, Roosevelt joined in a dark joke about executing German
officers that deeply strained Churchill’s sensitivities. Churchill equally observed after an underthe-table agreement with Stalin that the American “president would be shocked” by what they
were doing.64 This minor turbulence within Anglo-American relations may have been viewed
through a Soviet lens of paranoid Marxist principles and wishful thinking that would have easily
backed their own assumptions.
Stalin’s speech at the Bolshoi Theater reveals the Soviet conclusion on what deteriorating
relations would create. He uses the Second World War’s origins as a conflict between Western
countries to prove that capitalism naturally divides itself into warring factions. He calls this
division a capitalist attempt to “redistribute ‘spheres of influence’” when markets experience
uneven growth and scarce resources.65 Notably, this part of his speech shows that the assumption
of a warlike and deteriorating West is based within Soviet ideological conceptions instead of real
analysis. Stalin and some of his associates were avid readers, but there were significant gaps
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within their analysis of the outside world. Djilas observed on numerous occasions that Stalin and
his associates often failed understanding basic information about their ally Yugoslavia, for
example.66 This observation may have been a part of his own biases, but he also observed that
“Stalin was well acquainted with Russian literature—though only Russian—but the only real
knowledge he had outside of Russian limits was his knowledge of political history.”67 This was
harsh criticism of a man who may have read five-hundred pages a day for most of his life. The
Kremlin did seem to have a fascination with non-Russian literature at times. For example, the
entire Politburo enjoyed Last of the Mohicans for its damning of Western Imperialism.68 Djilas
and Politburo’s tastes make it clear that assessments of the outside world would have been based
in a paranoid and insular Marxist perspective. Gaddis writes that during this time, the bugged
rooms that Western diplomats stayed in recorded their private discussions about “the need for
cooperation in the reconstruction of Europe.” Nevertheless, Stalin at least trusted his own
paranoia. Lenin, Novikov, and two world wars had proven to him that Western unity was
temporary.69
Many aspects of Stalin’s Bolshoi Theater speech and Novikov’s telegram ironically
blame the West for a division of the world into spheres of influence. Stalin’s use of the phrase
“spheres of influence” to critically describe Western international policy matches the Soviet
Union’s own diplomatic policy.70 The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was a clear example of how
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Soviet leadership wanted their own sphere of influence opposite of Nazi Germany. In
comparison, Anglo-American intentions wished for the opposite of what the Soviets had labeled
them with. Churchill and Roosevelt agreed during the war that the only way to achieve lasting
peace was for increased postwar cooperation. This consensus hinged on international
cooperation, a United Nations, Wilsonian self-determination, and increased economic
cooperation.71 The United States hinted at this sustained belief in its first response to the Stalin
note. The response argued that “such provisions would be a step backwards and might jeopardize
the emergency in Europe of a new era in which international relations would he based on
cooperation and not on rivalry and mistrust.” A world with a Soviet-backed “neutral” Germany
would fundamentally ruin a higher ideal of “European unity.”72 The evolving consensus created
between Churchill and Roosevelt showed that the world was attempting to move beyond the
Kremlin’s ideological framework. Given Soviet ideological convictions, it seems unlikely that
they recognized this shift. These intelligence failures within Soviet thinking were not necessarily
inexcusable given the chaotic diplomatic environment of the late 1940s. The length of time
Stalin and many of his associates persisted in their belief of these assumptions was inexcusable.
In Stalin’s last major work, “Economic Problems of Socialism,” he argued that production within
disintegrating capitalist countries will continue following cylindrical recessions, but “the volume
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of production in these countries will diminish.” 73 Molotov said that this was one of many
“defects” that many of the magnates who “were bad at theory” failed to appreciate at the time.74
The Soviets were certainly partially aware of ideological, diplomatic, and military factors
that affected their beliefs of the West. Yet these concerns became nullified in the face of the
legitimacy of the Second World War’s lessons. Obviously, the ideological perspective was
already sacrosanct within the Soviet Union. Soviets had died over far less for saying otherwise
under the regime. Molotov summarized that “Marxism is an objective science…It demands
genuine, uncompromising struggle for the good.”75 In that kind of black and white environment,
it was difficult, but not necessarily impossible to compromise on an issue. Yet it would be
difficult to rationalize any nuanced perspectives in a world with only good and bad players. For
example, Molotov points out that in retrospect, if the Soviet Union during Lenin’s time worked
towards “peaceful coexistence,” they believed that “the imperialists would have given us no kind
of peace.”76 This rationality carried over into the Cold War when coexistence was exactly the
mentality necessary to prevent nuclear war. Yet the Soviets had significant reason for trusting
this mentality. As Stalin argued within his Bolshoi Theater speech, the West failed to understand
the resiliency of the Soviet Union.77 The end of the war meant that Communist thinking was now
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more justified in their own eyes than ever before. The diplomatic aggressiveness exhibited by the
Soviet Union appeared as a logical and appropriate reaction to protect their interests.
The Soviet government throughout the postwar period followed a policy of military
preparations. These preparations combined Marxist-Leninist beliefs about the next war. Historian
William Odem argued that the Soviet military based their plans on the assumption that they
would have to take on the entire capitalist world in the next war. This required a military “many
times larger than a realistic assessment of the actual military threats.” 78 While this may seem
contradictory to the consensus of a divided West, Novikov explained there was a possibility “of
an Anglo-American military alliance in order to establish joint world domination” at least
temporarily.79 Regardless of whether such an alliance was the case, the country kept expanding
its already labyrinthine military-industrial complex and would pour resources into military
expenditures. This was on top of both the pre-war Five-Year Plans and the devastation of the
war. Historian Mark Harrison explains that there are multiple figures for calculating the Soviet
defense budget as a percentage of national GDP. But most of the calculations of early postwar
military spending seem to keep pace with the prewar military expansion from 1940. As a
peaceful baseline, figures in 1928 and 1937 were 2% and 6% respectively. Soviet preparations
for the war peaked at 17% in 1940 and postwar spending only dropped to 10% by 1950. The
Soviets were certainly not spending 60% like in 1942, but they remained at least militarily
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prepared for any contingencies compared to 1928 to 1937.80 This speculation matches political
attitudes in preventing an immediate war with the West while equally embarking upon long term
preparations for it. Yet beyond immediate military spending, there were other aspects of
militarization beyond the military itself.
It is important to keep in mind that one of the main aims of Soviet demilitarization after
the war was to rebuild Soviet heavy industry to defend the country. The military secretly
demobilized as many troops as possible to reinforce the labor pool for this industrial recovery.81
The strange military to military-industrial pipeline’s purposes were clear to its laborers and
Soviet leadership. The language of progress reports from these industrialization campaigns used
military terminology like “mobilization,” “shock troops,” and “ambushes” to describe the
otherwise ordinary process of industrial buildup.82 At the same time, the United States was
demilitarizing through this period, although that concept completely passed over Novikov’s
head. The reality was that the United States spent so little on military affairs prior to the war. 83
Thus, in comparison to the postwar responsibilities of occupation in places as far flung as
Germany and Japan, the minimum budget was inherently going to be larger. Novikov even
mistakenly accuses that the United States was creating its first peacetime draft in history.84 The
first peacetime draft occurred in 1940, long before the Soviet Union even entered American
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military consideration. Military occupation did play a role within postwar Soviet militarization as
well. Soviet occupation forces played a key role in ensuring Soviet bloc countries remained
compliant with both socialism and reparation payments.85
Molotov points out succinctly that “Stalin looked at it this way: World War I has wrested
one country from capitalist slavery; World War II has created a socialist system; and the third
will finish of imperialism forever.”86 On one hand, the country triumphed over Nazi Germany
and resolved itself of any immediate external threats. On the other hand, Stalin and his associates
had many reasons to fear the risk of future threats to Soviet security. The country entered the
postwar world ready to expand upon this new “socialist system” and prepare for the next war. To
achieve this, the government followed an eclectic mix of ideological, military, and imperial
concerns in their diplomacy. These ideas could easily align with each other while contradicting
each other at the same time. There were often alternatives and signs that this did not have to be
the only course of action. However, Soviet goals only reinforced themselves to a point where it
was difficult to consider or attempt alternative options. These goals would come to affect the
Soviet people in a variety of ways. Domestic society prepared itself militarily, industrially, and
ideologically while both taking and supplying resources to its new imperial subjects. The Soviet
Union therefore committing itself to a course of action that rejected international cooperation
outside its bloc and prevented real recovery at home. Stalin’s argument for the future was state
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policy, but there was no comment on whether socialism would live through an experience in
which “the living would envy the dead,” as Khrushchev may have later stated.87

87

Library of Congress, Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations, ed. Suzy Platt (New York: Barnes

& Noble Books, 1993)., 239.

35

CHAPTER 3. DOMESTIC ISSUES
The Hope for Peace, The Need for Recovery, & The Political Reality
The Soviet entanglement abroad occurred at a time when there was a significant upswell
of support for various reforms and changes to domestic policies. The breakneck pace of Soviet
policies and the impact of the Second World War contributed to an increasing attitude for
recovery. The experiences of veterans at times united them around postwar societal problems.
Everyday citizens heard optimistic promises from their leadership and dealt with continuously
terrible living conditions. National leadership was aware of these problems and increasingly
considered if there were alternative courses of actions. At the same time, oppressive Soviet
policies abroad conflicted with these desires. Official propaganda managed to redirect some
pressure against the West. The government increasingly believed that international issues could
solve long-term internal ones at the cost of any immediate postwar reform. Attitudes for reform
became suppressed through a variety of societal pressures stemming from ideological, military,
and imperial issues that prevented the coalescence of any political force for change.
The pride after the Great Patriotic War was emblematic of both the problems and complaints
that would arise from Soviet policies. Stalin’s Bolshoi Theater speech made it clear that the war
was the test of the Soviet system. Henceforth, its actions were more legitimate than under the
experimental days of Lenin. He did recognize that the war legitimized the struggle for survival of
everyday Soviet citizens. Their survival through collectivization and the Five-Year Plans all
culminated in their survival over fascism. This was the reward of their efforts. More of these
policies would be necessary to rebuild the nation and defend from a foreign opponent. “Only
when we succeed in doing that can we be sure that our Motherland will be insured against all
contingencies,” Stalin concluded. Of course, Stalin was not so bold as to claim that the war
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insulated him from all criticisms. His speech was technically a speech to Soviet voters. He then
said that “Victors may and should be judged… I regard the election campaign as the voters'
judgment the Communist Party.”88 Stalin and his associates remained in power and the people
remained publicly supportive of the totalitarian state. Yet there was widespread dissatisfaction
with the course of postwar policies within the country. Collectivization, the Five-Year Plans, and
the war led to widespread problems for everyday people. “I have no husband and I have no
bread: I will neither go to the meeting nor will I vote,” one woman complained. The sentiment
was emblematic of the widespread dissatisfaction of many with their negligible role within the
political process.89 In the postwar era, Soviet legitimacy would stem from the lessons of war.
Private criticism of Soviet policies would also originate within their own lessons of the war.
The government did acknowledge the consequences and devastation of the war, but the
political lessons from this were complex. Happiness, for example, includes numerous references
to the war-torn state of the Soviet Union. Voropayev intends to live in a war-torn Crimean town
and recuperate from his extensive war injuries. The town is in bad shape with the lingering smell
of burnt wood hanging in the air. The settlers arriving in the area are disorganized and there
seems to be no life, not even barking dogs. Voropayev’s conclusion from the directionless
workers lingering around was not with those in charge, of course. “‘Like when our unit was
surrounded,’ was the thought that flashed through Voropayev's mind. ‘No order. No
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discipline.’”90 The conclusion from this comment would be that a disciplined workforce would
be productive and restore normality to the village. His understanding reveals the blame for these
matters lied with the individual people and their attitudes. His arguments about encirclement
within the context of the war are even more startling. A lack of discipline in the early years of the
war may have contributed to some defeats of the floundering Red Army. However, his
conclusion that order and discipline alone could have prevented an encirclement shows just how
domestic propaganda directed criticism down upon the lower rungs of Soviet society instead of
its leadership.
The victory also led many people to stand in opposition of the collective farms for a variety
of reasons. Some simply believed that this was the end of collectivization and heavy
industrialization since the outside threat ended. One collective farm worker said that “My
husband Aleksei fought for nothing in the war. He thought that, after the war, the collective
farms would be disbanded, but that didn't work out.”91 This sentiment reflected the sacrifices of
veterans and the lack of a payoff in postwar society. Many veterans and individuals who fought
or traveled through Central Europe understood that non-collectivized farms were more
prosperous, for example. “Look— in the western regions [which were incorporated into the
USSR in 1939] there are no collective farms and life is better,” one peasant argued.92 The story
of comrade colonel Voropayev merrily transforming a Crimean collective farm into a successful
enterprise through socialist gumption contrasted with the hopeless reality of postwar Soviet life.
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Fedor Abramov wrote a novel, Two Winters and Three Summers, which talked about the
experiences of those on a collective farm. The character Il’ia, a collective farmer, looked over the
well-leafed list of obligations he had as a tax. “Sheep’s milk cheese—raw. Blank. Not heard of in
Pekashino [the collective farm]. Milk. Of standard richness…Il’ia smiled here each time. He
smiled now. Il’ia had no cows.” The chairman had promised cows for Il’ia to raise, but problems
with the farm’s management prevented this. He “didn’t read further. However crafty you are,
however much you deceive yourself, whether you read from the end or the middle, it makes no
difference. You come to the meat.” Il’ia then admired the bigger picture of the situation: “why is
it city people can’t do without meat? But we can. Just ask me—when did our children last eat
meat?”93 Il’ia’s final comment reveals a rural-urban divide. The collective farms were essential
in supplying food to the industrial plans occurring in the city. The government prioritized this
industrial development over the well-being of the rural populace.
Mass famine was another aspect of society that the people endured through the postwar
era. According to economist Michael Ellman, the 1947 famine occurred from a combination of a
drought, confiscation of grain, exports, the exclusion of some peasants from rationing, and issues
with the rationing system.94 The rationing alone demonstrated Soviet priorities. Decree No. 380
denied bread to the unemployed, some dependents, and reduced bread allotments for the
countryside by 70%. The decrease in rations to the countryside combined with grain
appropriations was effectively a death sentence for those affected. Between 1.5 and 2 million

93

Fedor Abramov, “The Famine Years,” Seventeen Moments in Soviet History, 1984, accessed March 10,

2022, http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1947-2/famine-of-1946-1947/famine-of-1946-1947-texts/the-famine-years/.
94

Michael Ellman, “The 1947 Soviet Famine and the Entitlement Approach to Famines,” Cambridge

Journal of Economics 24, no. 5 (2000): 618.

39

people dying that winter. Ganson compares these figures with the Tsarist 1892 famine and finds
that “the increase in the death rate in 1947 in the USSR, including non-famine areas, was nearly
three times greater than the corresponding figure for the regions affected by famine in 1892: 2.85
versus 1.05.”95 It could also be opaque in its implementation. In a meeting on the situation, a
manager erroneously informed the public that “entire rural population was being taken off of
rationing.” Bread rations could take on a political angle as well as “teachers, medical providers,
and other workers” who were to receive bread did not for unknown reasons. The same manager
alluded to the Great Purges to get people to stop complaining to him about the situation. Even in
the metropole that was Moscow, forty bread stores closed and Muscovites mobbed the remaining
stores for bread. The blame placed on the unemployed and unimportant people for using up the
food was a significant factor in the famine. Ganson summarizes that “The workers, having
sinned against the government, could also be held accountable. Meanwhile, the authors of the
decree remained beyond judgment.”96 When people resorted to eating acorns or outright
cannibalism, the source of their hunger officially became isolated from the immediate problem.
Officials warned people that acorns could cause illnesses and arrested or institutionalized
cannibals. The confiscation and deprivation of grain did not officially factor into these matters.97
The position of the Soviet government in all these matters was complex on both a domestic
and international level. Certainly, the urban industrial divide played a key role in the allotment of
food. But the government would have considered the collective farms to be of the upmost
importance to both socialism and the Soviet state’s production. In fact, Stalin’s Bolshoi Theater

95

Ganson, “Famine of Victors,” 102, 205.

96

Ibid., 106-7.

97

Ibid., 153.

40

speech lauded the accomplishments of the collective farms as equal to that of the Five-Year
Plans.98 Molotov later framed negative criticisms of the harsh nature of national policies within
the mindset of leadership. He argued that “in bourgeois democracies they don’t do what needs to
be done.”99 In comparison, the state would go to extreme measures to carry out what they
thought was right. Based on Soviet propaganda, it seemed that convincing the people of the
legitimacy and promise of these actions was more important than actual societal improvements.
Molotov even recalls that the original collectivization and taxation efforts consisted of squeezing
out “every ruble and kopek” from the peasants to fund the revival of industry.100 Upon being
asked about the low wages of Soviet workers, Molotov argued that it was a complex problem.
But ultimately, he explained that “As long as imperialism exists it will be very difficult for
people to improve their lives. Defense capability and much else are needed.” 101 The Soviets
would have also considered ideology and production to be under threat if they traded or received
grain from the West. Djilas criticized how “Those who govern [in the Soviet Union] are still
themselves too poor to find dogmatism and monopoly rule a hinderance or superfluous, while the
Soviet economy can still exist enclosed in its own empire and can absorb the losses caused by its
separation from the world market.”102 Molotov also recalled that “We never resorted to
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purchasing food from abroad…we needed equipment and metals in the event of war…That
consideration came first.”103
There were alternative options that some within the government considered. The Soviets
would have traded with their socialist neighbors if possible. But the postwar situation in these
counties made importing grain a non-starter on top of the industrial and financial reparations.
This equally made it difficult to halt the exportation of grain since it would hinder the progress of
socialism. Molotov bitterly remarked that “after the war the Czechs used to take bread from us
and feed it to their livestock. And we were starving.”104 At the same time, there were voices from
many officials that easing the collection of grain would give long term benefits. Mikoyan and
even Molotov favored such a policy at times.105 But the most principal factor of all would have
been postwar ideological pride. Stalin’s speech reflects that the original collectivization
campaign faced significant opposition. “But the Party yielded neither to the threats of some nor
to the howling of others and confidently marched forward in spite of everything,” he recalled.106
The lesson was that by following the party line, the Soviet Union would be successful despite
short-term difficulties. Propaganda would be necessary to show the Soviet people that this was
the right course of action. Ellman makes it clear that unlike the 1930s, the 1947 famine’s primary
cause was environmental. But “had the policies of the government with respect to taxes and
procurements, stocks and international trade, been different from what they actually were, there
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might have been no famine, or only a much smaller one, despite the drought.”107 Yet after
decades of starvation in the Soviet Union, the problem seems to have been received with deaf
ears. But cracks were showing within the totalitarian Stalinist system. The impact of the war
created a vast change within the psyche of veterans and civilians. Why couldn’t the Soviet
government experience changes in their attitude as well?
A significant amount of Soviet propaganda during the era tried to frame everyday attention to
the real source of postwar issues: the West. While it is easy to accuse such messages of simply
diverting attention from famines and failed diplomatic exploits, the propaganda did properly
characterize the political dilemma of the country. The government worked off the MarxistLeninist belief that domestic prioritization was not possible until capitalism and class differences
disappeared. The surprise attack on the Soviet Union easily created seeds of mistrust among the
everyday people of capitalist intentions. Soviet propaganda simply needed to shift this common
mistrust onto the formerly anti-fascist West and change the Soviet identity of the war. Many
forms of media were contemporary pieces comparing the Soviet and American sides of the war.
The Meeting on the Elbe (1947 play, 1949 movie) portrayed American soldiers as immature,
undisciplined, cultural degenerates who relied upon aggressiveness. This heavily contrasted with
battle hardened and disciplined Soviet troops. One early scene in which a Soviet soldier first sees
the Americans at the river Elbe sums up the pessimistic message of the film. The soldier says,
“Look, it is the last day of war—and finally we have a second front” against Germany. This
perspective of the famous meeting of Soviet and American troops contrasts with the positive
attitudes that occurred at the actual event. Historian Rósa Magnúsdóttir argues that this party line
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whiplash may have been difficult to accept for Soviet viewers. The “memory of the war itself
and the suffering of the Soviet population” were likely the main factors in acceptance of a
supposed American betrayal. Propaganda was rapidly reforming the meaning of the war in the
face of deteriorating Soviet-American relations.108
Another area of analysis these works adopted was theme of regular Americans versus
capitalists and reactionaries. The play, The Voice of America (1949), follows the story of a
decorated American soldier who returns from the war to face the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities. The film derives its name from the eponymous postwar radio station that
broadcasted pro-American messages across the new Soviet bloc. Many of the films characters
from senators to police officers are a stand in for the “fascist stratum” of America. Ironically,
veterans returned to the Soviet Union to experience their own form of trial in the face of
oppressive economic and political policies. Interestingly, these films try to bridge the divide
between wartime pro-Western messages and postwar anti-Western ones. The Russian Question
(1946 play 1948 movie) follows a journalist fighting the capitalist “Wall Street” oppression of
everyday people. The main character nevertheless extolls the vision of the “America of Abraham
Lincoln, in the America of Franklin Roosevelt.”109 These kinds of media gained remarkable
success but walked a tightrope between the evolving party line or accusations of praising
America. Both the movie versions of The Meeting on the Elbe and The Russian Question later
faced criticisms for their dated anti-American messages compared to more recently written
works. The Voice of America play faced the worst of this backlash when it used American
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magazines showing a better life as props. Criticism quickly grew to question the non-workingclass nature of the main character. Playwright Boris Lavrenev then personally wrote to Stalin to
try to convince him of the film’s suitability for Soviet audiences. For the country, anti-American
propaganda could not risk showing the disparity between postwar American and Soviet
society.110
This kind of propaganda also played a key role within the complex struggle for peace
movement occurring at the time. The struggle for peace was a public face of the Marxist-Leninist
understanding that the West was inherently militaristic. One rather insensitive resolution of the
Central Committee explained that “It is necessary to explain that the Soviet peace-loving foreign
policy relies on the might of the Soviet state and, that reinforcing its might with their creative
labor, Soviet people are strengthening the security of the people.”111 The suffering of those in
collective farms or heavy industry directly connected with the vitality of national security. The
result of a world war instigated by capitalist powers “can lead only to the collapse of the
capitalist system and its replacement by the socialist system.” Given that the Soviet Union
wanted a socialist world, there was quite the conflict of interest over their desire for peace. The
Meeting on the Elbe’s characterization of American soldiers as aggressive compared to their
Soviet counterparts would give viewers an understanding of the inevitability of such a war. This
was not a challenging task to achieve when the Soviet people had just faced a surprise attack on
their nation several years earlier. The people quickly fell under a war scare of whether they could
come under attack by the United States. The deceptiveness of Soviet propaganda in creating this
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fiction did cause questions about why America would engage in such a senseless fight so soon
after the last war. Those sentiments became irrelevant through the rallying of the people around
jingoist patriotism to rebuild the country.112 This spirit was not as successful in masking the
immediate hardship everyday Soviet people faced at the same time.
The needs of veterans in the postwar Soviet Union were complex yet surprisingly cohesive at
times. State sanctioned media reflected the power of this unified group within Soviet society.
Author and journalist Pyotr Pavlenko’s novel Happiness includes numerous statements about a
veteran’s problems within the postwar Soviet Union. In one section, the main character,
Voropayev, rallies veterans at a collective farm asking, “Did we fight at the front only to perish
at home?”113 He then uses the experiences of the various veterans listening to his speech to win
their support. Shortly after, he coerces a veteran who did not serve on the frontlines. The veteran
attempts weakly argue that “his conscience was clear” on his war service, but Voropayev
despised “this retired bureaucrat, whose whole character ran against the Soviet grain.” 114
Voropayev’s use of the experiences of veterans and his attitudes for bureaucratic authority were
easily relatable for Soviet veterans after the war. The authorities encouraged these traits in
invigorating the Soviet people and deriding cosmopolitism. The idea of soldiers behind the
frontlines engaged in bureaucracy was not an unusual idea in the postwar Soviet Union. The
depiction of Stalin in the novel even says “Unfortunately, we still have a lot of people who prefer
to remain officials in Moscow rather than be leaders in the provinces…but their time will end
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soon” he says ominously.115 Paradoxically, these attitudes would serve veterans well in their
attempts to reform Soviet politics against local officials.
There was a real connection veterans gained between their own identities and the wider
world through the war. The nation fought a unique fight against fascism for four years and
suffered through immense sacrifices. This resulted in a strong, yet exploitable draw of the nature
of the war on a more global scale. Officially, the Soviet Union recognized the important service
veterans gave their country yet treated them no differently than any other group. Marxist
polemics dictated that if the status of veterans strayed too far from non-veterans, the country
would effectively place them in a new social class. Western veterans organizations were
lobbying to resist the Soviet Union, so the concept of independently organized veterans became
reactionary. Thus, attention to veterans was meant to be little different from what any other
person in the country received. The government did acquiesce to the creation of the Soviet
Committee of War Veterans (1956) to synergize with official propaganda that veterans and nonveterans all enjoyed a better way of life within the Soviet Union. This “Potemkin organization”
would stand for Soviet interests for international veterans movements and organizations. In the
process, it would bolster the military and ideological prestige of the Soviet system. Veterans did
not see the organization in the official manner, however. Individuals who participated in the
organization began attempting to use it as a mouthpiece for domestic problems.116
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These voices for the support of veteran concerns quickly got to the point where leadership
within the organization needed to constantly harp on their official mission of state propaganda.
One veteran asked of the senior political leadership: “Where do these candidates come from,
who nominates them? We don’t need either generals nor [sic] colonels. We met here mainly with
questions about our transportation—wheelchairs. An organizer responded that “You have to
understand the goals and tasks of our organization. Our basic task is public work in defense of
peace.”117 This defense of peace was identical to the common struggle for peace narrative that
the Central Committee had been pushing in propaganda and over the heads of individual
Soviets.118 While this united the Soviet people to oppose the aggressive West, it may have done
little to modify their negative perception of the state of their own country. Thus, Soviet veterans
would surprisingly continue ignoring the stated purpose of the organization. These individuals
united around their shared experiences and what they perceived as unfair treatment for their
service in the war. Another functionary frustratingly complained that “I have already explained
our statutes on two presidium meetings, and now I will say it for the third time…It is very
important for our fight for peace that we work among the several tens of thousands of people
who are organized in the two international organizations of veterans.”119
Everyday civilians also had their own forms of protest and resistance of the party line. The
most extreme example of this resistance used outright violence and opposition to oppose Soviet
rule. In the Ukrainian SSR, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) maintained an independence
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movement against the Soviet government through the late Stalinist period. Most of their
activities thus consisted of more nationalist orientated anti-Soviet activities but they also helped
to spread information on flaws within Soviet policies and propaganda. Documents spread by the
UPA include official Soviet policies towards confiscating food from collective farms. Other
documents spread information on those sent to the gulags and the accusations against them. A
pamphlet titled “Guidelines for Parents in Educating Children” showed their disgust with Soviet
policies and propagate the importance of informing even children of these matters. The pamphlet
warned parents to instruct their children “what damage and crimes the Bolsheviks are
perpetrating against the Ukrainian nation.” The cost of these activities under the late Stalinist
Soviet Union were obviously quite harsh. Officials would even go as far as to burn dairy farm
cooperatives to the ground just to deny the UPA of the sealable milk jugs they would use as
document caches for these pamphlets.120
Most Soviet citizens would have found it difficult to bear the price of this level of anti-Soviet
resistance and thus resorted to more passive measures. In the context of domestic policy changes,
the Soviet people rarely targeted senior leadership as responsible for social and economic
problems. This stemmed from a combined reality of propaganda from above and reality below
affecting the everyday perception of events. Propaganda lauded the “peace-loving” nature of the
government and its struggles in advancing socialism for the people. At the same time, the people
faced the negative taxation and repressive state policies from local bureaucracy. Historian
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Nicholas Ganson summarizes the peasant response to the 1947 famine: “The implication was
obvious: local representatives of state power, and not the Soviet leadership, were responsible for
the poverty of the peasantry.” Oddly, upper Soviet leadership also blamed local officials for the
famine. Local officials took the blame for pilfering cattle, grain, and money from the collective
farms. There was certainly some truth to this corruption, but these accusations ignored the source
of the issue from above.121
An anecdote from Djilas about his chauffeur in Moscow may explain the opinions of many
Soviets in the context of international issues. The man in question, Panov, “found it impossible
to believe that there were more cars in New York and Paris, although he did not hide his
dissatisfaction with the quality of new Soviet cars.”122 This was the duality of the average Soviet
person: steeped in the socialist propaganda against the West and passively critical of the
problems within their own country. For an everyday person, believing both would have created a
rather bleak world. Soviet ideology emphasized a vision of the future might have well been
comparable to promises of fusion power just down the road in 20 years every 20 years. At the
same time, the outside world was a reactionary, capitalist dystopia. What was a Soviet citizen to
believe in outside of their own struggle to survive? This did not mean that people were entirely
unaware of the wider issues either. Perhaps some realized that localized and passive resistance
was far safer. One banned ditty or chastushka at a collective farm went:
Part of the wheat—abroad
All of the potatoes— for vodka
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And to the hungry farmers they say:
Go to the movies.123

The ditty offers three criticisms of Soviet policies during the 1947 famine. First, it criticizes the
exportation of wheat to the greater Soviet bloc during the famine. The quantity of wheat exported
was small, but at a time of starvation, it appears the common people both knew and disapproved
of it. Second, the potatoes to vodka line could reference the mixed Stalinist-Leninist line towards
alcohol. Originally, state vodka was a Tsarist tax on an addicted peasantry. The Soviets stopped
this practice, then reinstated it around 1925 after they needed the revenue.124 There was a clear
conflict of interest of continuing the vodka monopoly for revenue while people starved. Third,
the movie reference easily alludes to the propaganda occurring at the time. Given the Soviet
mission in educating the populace of the ideological, military, and imperial goals of Soviet
policies, this was an insult to those who endured the consequences of those policies.
Magnúsdóttir concludes that the countless letters and passive resistance of Soviet citizens did
not result in any real changes on the part of Soviet leadership or propaganda. This was even
though the Central Committee regularly collected svodki (“moods of the population”) reports.
Rather, the reports showed the importance of “popular introduction and mobilization” of the
Soviet people was important, not private grumblings.125 The effectiveness of books like
Happiness and films like The Russian Question were important to Soviet leadership. These kinds
of popular media would coalesce the Soviet people around the ideological, military, and imperial
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issues of the political leadership. The Soviet people were ultimately to bear both the
consequences of this burden and endorse its reasoning.
The demanding situation everyday people found themselves in within the postwar Soviet
Union made them entertain the idea of reform or at least reducing the worst of Stalinist policies.
Propaganda and political suppression prevented any tangible results from these sentiments. At
the core of Soviet opposition to these changes was its ideological, military, and imperial
obsession. Stalin once said that “peace will be preserved and strengthened if the peoples take the
cause of peace into their own hands and uphold it to the end.” The public Soviet mindset
revolved around this conviction that the nation peacefully stood opposed to warmongering
capitalism. Yet as the passive resistance of everyday individuals showed, the people played little
role in how the state decided to pursue this. The Soviet Union had endured decades of these
sacrifices, and this was no different. Someone asked Molotov in 1971 why he said that
imperialism would collapse in the 20th century. He simply responded, “In January 1917 Lenin
did not know that in ten months he would become head of government.”126 This was the hope
that Soviet policy based itself around. Of course, Molotov did not know that in 20 years, the
Soviet Union would finally face the contradictions of its hardline obligations.
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION
In This Lies the Whole Tragedy
The last group that argued for an alternative vision within the postwar Soviet Union was the
leadership itself. The government had their own complex motivations and feelings of how to
manage the country. A brief comparison of the late Stalinist era to the Khrushchev years reveals
the importance of ideological, military, and imperial issues within the suppression of reform. The
1956 de-Stalinization speech formed one of the most significant changes to Stalinist ideals that
influenced Soviet policies prior to Gorbachev. Khrushchev unequivocally denounced the
excesses of Stalin’s cult of personality and his repression of society.127 These ideological
changes also intersected with attempted efforts at prioritizing butter over guns within the
Khrushchev era. The Soviet military-industrial complex proved to be much more resilient than
expected, however. Molotov recalled that Stalin’s relationship with the military remained good
during his leadership. “Only Khrushchev experienced hostility” from them.128 Changes to the
imperial rung of Soviet policies began even before 1956. The 1953 agreement between the
Soviets and the GDR already pulled back on the worst of the reparation policies. This agreement
made it clear that harsh reparations and massive pushes towards socialism would destabilize the
Soviet bloc and more subtle efforts would follow. Yet it is within the imperial rung that the limits
of Khrushchev’s reforms were on full display for the world. The suppression of the revolts in
Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) showed that de-Stalinization had strong limits.
Khrushchev’s replacement with Brezhnev furthered this failure. The roll-back of aspects of de-
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Stalinization after this alluded to how the Soviet Union could not actually escape from the cage
of their ideological, military, and imperial mindsets. Brezhnev instead avoided the root causes of
international and domestic problems for a “senile cold war.” A détente would exist with the West
that would resolve the worst of hostilities and the domestic sphere would equally remain frozen
between Stalinism and de-Stalinization.”129
Notably, the de-Stalinization speech’s most glaring omission was any rebuke of the
international mindset that had gotten the country into so many problems. Khrushchev said that
Stalin’s actions protected the working class from “the plotting of the enemies and against the
attack of the imperialist camp.” He then contributed his only praise of Stalin that “we cannot say
that these were the deeds of a giddy despot,” but rather in “the interests of the victory of
socialism…In this lies the whole tragedy!” 130 This last line was the real tragedy of the Soviet
system. His support for the Stalinist line of ideological, military, and imperial understanding of
the world meant that it would remain. Prior to Khrushchev’s leadership, there were calls from
people like Lavrentiy Beria and Georgy Malenkov for a change of the Stalinist ideological,
military, and imperial line. The German question provides an excellent example of these
alternatives. Molotov fought with Beria through 1953 over whether the Soviet Union should
embrace East Germany, or a neutral united Germany. Although Beria’s attempts to tone back the
imperial course within Germany ended with both the revolt and his execution.131 Malenkov also
spoke to East Germans about how a divided Germany would inevitably place the Soviet bloc on
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the path to war with the West. He then argued that if the Social Democrats in West Germany rise
to power, a compromise over a unified Germany would be possible.132 Unlike Stalin’s vague
commitments, this was easily a far more generous of a statement. He was later heavily rebuked
within the Central Committee for making such statements. Khrushchev said that “it was cheap
stuff” that placed him in league with anti-Marxist arguments along with Beria. He had a point
that it would have caused the East Germans and others to question socialism’s viability if the
Soviets left. Yet he also argued that Malenkov’s accusations that civilization would end in a war
on the current course were “goddammed gibberish” that failed to take ideological considerations
of the inevitability of socialism in mind.133 Nevertheless, it was one of many missed
opportunities that the Soviets could have used to extricate themselves from the complexities of
future imperial and military issues with a neutral buffer state.
The postwar Soviet Union remained militarized and failed to reform itself because of its
ideological concerns against the West and its new satellite states, all at the cost of the Soviet
people. These concerns were more significant than any real postwar recovery that would benefit
Soviet society. There was significant clamoring for change among the people at a time of
extreme hardship from years of collectivization, industrialization, and war. These ideas remained
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suppressed under international concerns through propaganda and repression. The government
was committed towards following through in its commitments no matter the cost.
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